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Abstract 
This essay discusses the complex relation between the knowledges and practices of the researcher 
and his/her informants in terms of lateral concepts. The starting point is that it is not the 
prerogative of the (STS) scholar to conceptualize the world; all our “informants” do it too. This 
creates the possibility of enriching our own conceptual repertoires by letting them be inflected by 
the concepts of those we study. In a broad sense, the lateral means that there is a many-to-many 
relation between domains of knowledge and practice. However, each specific case of the lateral is 
necessarily immanent to a particular empirical setting and form of inquiry. In this sense lateral 
concepts are radically empirical since it locates concepts within the field. To clarify the meaning 
and stakes of lateral concepts, we first make a contrast between lateral anthropology and Latour’s 
notion of infra-reflexivity. We end with a brief illustration and discussion of how lateral 
conceptualization can re-orient STS modes of inquiry, and why this matters.  
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Introduction 
Ever since ethnographic methods were first deployed in science and technology studies more 
than forty years ago, the field has been engaged in discussions about the relation between the 
knower and the known. Given that similar discussions have unfolded within anthropology and 	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that STS is, in part, populated by anthropologists, the contact zone between these fields has 
gradually enlarged. Presently, ethnography operates simultaneously as a shared set of resources 
and as a domain of contestation in which knowledge production is being problematized in – and 
across – both fields.3  
A key issue raised by ethnography is the complex relation between the knowledges 
(theories, concepts, assumptions) and practices of the researcher and those of the “informant.” In 
anthropology, it is generally accepted that theories should not simply be “applied” as 
explanations of ethnographic settings but ought also in some sense to be shaped by those 
settings. But what is entailed by this requirement? How it can be operationalized? And with a 
view to what? These questions are far from settled.  
An ethico-political impulse often motivates calls to let other modes of knowing and 
doing inform anthropological understandings. However, one can reach similar conclusions by a 
somewhat more descriptive route, by noticing that it is empirically the case that diverse forms of 
knowledge constantly spill over, modifying and inflecting one another.  
This traffic of ideas and practices raises conceptual and methodological questions. The 
gambit of this essay is that, rather than trying to demarcate what properly belongs to STS (as 
theory) and what belongs to the empirical (and is thus data), we might enrich our conceptual 
repertoires and vocabularies by experimenting with these relations. The outcome is lateral 
concepts. 
 The premise of lateral concepts is that informants are “fellow travellers along the routes 
of social abstraction and analysis” (Maurer 2005: xv). Accordingly, there is no dichotomous or 
hierarchical relation between our concepts and informants’ (Jensen 2014). The situation can be 
described as a Latourian “flat plane” on which all actors, researchers included, act and think. In 
this process, practices, theories and concepts move around laterally; they bump into each other, 
rub up against one another, and modify one another.   
Latour’s symmetrical plane is often said to ignore important differences, hierarchies, 
stratifications or forms of power. Let us therefore reiterate that it has nothing to do with the 
weird idea that everything is “equal.” To the contrary, it has everything to do with creating a 
methodological position from which differences can be articulated and multiplied. A “flat” 
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starting point is required simply because we cannot in advance know what the relevant 
differences and subsequent asymmetries will turn out to be.4  
If “informants” are indeed “fellow travellers,” it follows that at least some of their 
concepts and ideas hold potential for troubling, complicating or improving our own. We might 
thus say that the aim of lateral concepts is to simultaneously take into account insights developed 
in STS and the interpretations and forms of knowledge of informants.  
This is not necessarily an easy task. For one, we often find ourselves confronted with 
notions that seem incompatible, or even incommensurable, with STS modes of understanding 
(Walford 2013). Ironically, however, problems also arise if the concepts and interpretations of our 
interlocutors seem “too similar” to our own (Riles 2000).   
 In one sense, the lateral designates the broad observation that domains of knowledge and 
practice influence each other in unpredictable ways.  At this level, the lateral can be seen as a 
“meta-concept.” In one sense, therefore, our note can be read as a generic characterization of how 
concepts are generated.  
 In another sense, however, lateral concepts are entirely immanent to particular inquiries. 
This is because their development begins with the recognition of specific kinds of movement 
between forms of knowledge within a particular field of concern. If movements and 
modifications of forms of knowledge happen continuously, the lateral question becomes one of 
activation: how might researchers draw energy from something that is happening in front of our 
eyes anyway. At this level, lateral conceptualization is thus thoroughly empirical. We might even 
say that it is radically empirical, in that concepts and theories are seen to be located within the 
empirical field itself. 
 Provisionally, we might thus define lateral conceptualization as efforts at concept 
development and improvement that work on the basis of a mutual modification of STS (or 
otherwise “academic”) concepts and the varied concepts and ideas encountered in the field. 
Further on, we offer some examples of what this might mean. 
 We begin, however, with a brief introduction to lateral anthropology. Because this 
“approach” emerged as a sympathetic yet critical counter-point to actor-network theory, we 
subsequently turn to Latour’s (1988) argument for “infra-reflexivity,” in order to figure out just 
what lateral analysis reacted against. We end by illustrating some ways in which lateral 
conceptualization enables a reorientation of STS modes of inquiry. 	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differences as routinely assumed by those who critique Latour in the name of “politics.” 
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Lateral Anthropology  
In The Gender of the Gift, Marilyn Strathern (1988) insisted that anthropological analysis would 
have to take its starting point in indigenous conceptualization. She was clear, however, that it 
would have to do so without simply adopting “found” concepts. In later works (1992a, 1992b), 
she used notions of Melanesian personhood as a lever for the analysis of English kinship. The 
lateral is exhibited in both of these moves. First, Strathern loosened the relation between “our” 
concepts and “theirs.” Second, she positioned them as contexts for each other, deploying 
Melanesian ideas as a resource for rethinking British ones and vice versa. 
 Strathern did not use the notion of the lateral. However, the anthropologist Bill Maurer 
(2005) referred explicitly to his study of Islamic banking and alternative currencies as a 
deployment of “lateral reason” (see also e.g. Helmreich 2011). Pointing out that ethnographic 
sites are already overflowing with peoples’ concepts and comparisons, Maurer asked how found 
concepts might be allowed to make a difference for anthropological analysis. Dispensing with the 
aspiration to offer anthropological meta-explanations that would “trump” those encountered in 
the field, he located social science knowledges alongside those they investigate. Thus, his analysis 
“revealed the tropes of Islamic Banking, alternative currencies, and my inquiry as open and 
unsteady” (2005: 11). The traffic of concepts was seen to run in multiple directions.  
 Strathern’s former student, Annelise Riles made similar arguments. Her emphasis was 
especially on situations where “our” knowledges and those of informants are in some sense too 
close. New kinds of anthropological response are called for, she suggested, in contexts where the 
distance between “our” understandings and “theirs” threatens to collapse. If, for example, NGO 
workers already conceive their activities in terms of networks, what is analytically gained by 
offering a network analysis of them? In this situation, an unqualified acceptance of informants’ 
self-understandings would merely reinforce what we think we already know.5 What is needed in 
this situation are devices for estrangement rather than for familiarization. Thus, for example, 
Riles turned practices of Fijian mat making into a conceptual and comparative device for the 
interpretation of policy documents (2000: 70ff). 
As this example indicates, lateral reason does not impose any fixed obligation on the 
researcher. After all, nothing demanded that Riles used mats to understand policy. At issue, 	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instead, is an experimental opening up of resources for thinking. The wager is that such materials 
hold the capacity for troubling or reorienting conventional theory in productive ways if given the 
chance. 
 As noted, lateral reason has been developed in explicit response to actor-network theory. 
In contrast with the realism and empiricism of the latter (sometimes perceived, sometimes 
avowed), Strathern, Riles and Maurer insist on inventiveness as a key ingredient of ethnographic 
description (Jensen 2012). Maurer, for example, comments critically on an undercurrent of 
empiricist realism that he perceives within ANT:  
 
Latour’s realism is problematic for the same reason that it is so useful: refusing the 
separation of epistemology from ontology opens up the enumerable black boxes that 
warrant “reality,” but it does so in terms of that refusal’s own agnosticism (Maurer 2005: 
14).  
 
The empiricism and realism to which Maurer alludes is captured by Latour’s famous slogan 
“follow the actors,” later morphed into the metaphor of the STS scholar as an “ant” that 
meticulously traces naturally occurring relations between heterogeneous actors. Yet, it is only 
possible to claim the ability to depict reality as such, if the researcher is capable of neutrally 
registering it.  Maurer is asking us to consider whether the “ant” is indeed able to miraculously 
evade the problems of representation that have haunted anthropology since the 1980s.  
At this point, then, there is a direct point of contact between lateral anthropology and 
STS, at least in its ANT guise. To understand the workings of lateral concepts, let us therefore 
examine this contact zone in a bit more detail. 
  
 
Infra-reflexive Ambiguities 
In the 1980s, anthropology was grappling with the so-called crisis of representation (Clifford and 
Marcus 1986). At issue were the (im-)possibility and political implications of representing “the 
other.” One outcome was new forms of reflexive ethnographic writing.  Something similar was 
afoot in science and technology studies. In Knowledge and Reflexivity, Steve Woolgar (1988) argued 
that STS too was haunted by a lingering tendency to descriptivism and objectivism. Maurer’s 
critical comments on Latour’s “agnosticism” offer an updated version of this kind of critique. 
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In some ways analogous to Writing Culture, Woolgar’s solution was to write multi-
layered and self-reflexive texts. These experimental efforts would circumvent the possibility that 
readers would take the text for a “correct” representation of its object.  
Bruno Latour also contributed to Knowledge and Reflexivity. However, rather than 
following the path suggested by Woolgar, his chapter offered a critique of the volume’s reflexive 
ambition. Referring to this ambition as “meta-reflexive,” Latour argued that it leads to an endless 
spiral of self-referential commentary in which the substance of inquiry recedes from view. 
Even so, self-reference does not enable the writer to solve any problems of 
representation. Because the writer operates in a representational space as soon as s/he puts pen 
to paper, Latour argues, there is no “problem” to be overcome in the first place. What meta-
reflexivity does is simply to tip the textual balance, so that more of the writer`s energy goes into 
making visible the workings of the text itself rather than its supposed subject. Latour’s infra-
reflexive alternative is concerned, instead, with figuring out how to convey in writing bits of 
reality “imported” from outside the text: 
 
Instead of piling on layer upon layer of self-consciousness, why not have just one layer, 
the story, and obtain the necessary amount of reflexivity from somewhere else? (Latour 
1988: 170)  
 
There is a certain ambiguity here. The “somewhere else” invoked by Latour might refer to the 
intellectual resources and stylistic devices which all writers, including “journalists, poets, and 
novelists” (170) deploy to make their texts “good” or “convincing.” But in the case of journalists 
and ethnographers, there is a complex relation between those resources and the materials 
encountered in the field. 
 As we have noted, the ambiguous relation between writing and field is the very 
signature of lateral concepts as we defined them above. Yet Latour wavers about the implications 
of the ambiguity. Thus, he has also argued that the most suitable role for ANT researchers is to 
operate as “ants” that simply “trace” the world’s contours. When Maurer complains about 
Latour’s agnosticism and Riles insists on the importance of “invention,” they are reacting to this 
empiricist claim.   
 The situation is therefore complicated. As anyone who has read Latour’s own works 
knows, far from merely “tracing” the activities and relations of people and things, he is engaged 
in a constant conceptual labor. In this light, Latour’s insistence that other scholars should simply 
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“trace” reality appears disingenuous. At the same time, as we have seen, “infra-reflexivity” is 
clearly not an argument for any simple replacement of conceptual and stylistic experimentation 
with found reality. Quite differently, it designates a kind of open-ended invention in which 
analysts’ and informants’ concepts and practices both inform the textual re-description of 
realities. We can thus read the “infra-reflexivity” as an STS precursor of lateral analysis. 
 If it is nevertheless only a precursor, the reason is precisely Latour’s tendency to 
withdraw from the lateral entailments of the argument and hide behind the discourse of 
empirical tracing. For if the “somewhere else” in the end comes to designate a field to be simply 
traced by ants, then what role might the stylistic and conceptual experimentation he also 
encourages possibly play? Rather than evading this problem, lateral conceptualization aims to 
activate it. 
 
 
Activations 
When STS ethnographers explore their fields, they are not the only “knowers,” for their 
“informants” are involved in their own knowledge practices. Since these concepts are shaped and 
transform through complex interactions with those of other informants, sometimes including 
social theorists, the “field” elicits lateral characteristics. What to do about this situation? Various 
possibilities suggest themselves.  
 For one, it is possible to simply ignore the lateral predicament. This is exemplified by the 
routine application of theories to explain “the empirical.” In such cases, the conventional 
dichotomy between theory and practice, desk and field, is in no way challenged. In contrast, 
lateral conceptualization is premised on the potentials of working with these lateral movements 
of divergent forms of knowledge; to activate them and let them interfere with standard analytical 
forms (Gad 2012, Gad and Jensen 2010, 2016).   
To go down the lateral route is not necessarily an easy decision, though, for in doing so 
one loses epistemic superiority. What is gained, however, is an experimental opening to other 
forms of encounters and concepts. At stake is a fundamental deregulation of how concepts and 
ideas are allowed to travel and interact. The name of the game cannot simply be empirical (“just 
follow the actors”), and the lateral certainly does not mean that theory becomes a “bad word” 
(“just leave the ivory tower and listen to what your informants are saying”).  
Symmetrically, however, lateral analysis also eschews the application of ready-made 
concepts and theories that do not run the risk of modification through worldly encounters. Since 
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both research practices and informants’ practices are involved in making knowledge, we might 
say that the lateral makes everything empirical. Since STS concepts and found concepts are put in 
conjunction, we might equally say that the lateral makes everything conceptual. Either way, the 
lateral sets in motion a dynamic reconfiguration of what it means to do analysis.  
But why one would voluntarily give up epistemological privilege? What is gained by 
doing so? The ethical response is that it is a way of taking people’s understandings seriously, 
rather than submerging them under our own pre-established theoretical categories. The 
analytical or conceptual response is that doing so makes it possible to shift or redefine questions 
premised on the sharp dichotomy between the conceptual and the empirical. We end this note by 
offering two brief examples of how that works. 
The first comes from Atsuro Morita’s (2014) excellent analysis of Thai mechanics working 
with Japanese second-hand harvesting machines in Northern Thailand. These machines often 
break down as farmers begin using them in their fields. It is the job of mechanics to fix them. As 
good practitioners, they are thus involved in the practical modification of machines. But as 
Morita shows, in order to succeed in this task, they use the broken machines as comparative 
devices for understanding the difference between Thai and Japanese fields. These comparisons 
generate a perspective on what Japanese fields look like, which is then used to imagine the 
modifications required for the machines to function under Thai conditions. 
This ethnography could easily go down the path of examining the “local, situated 
practices” of Thai farmers and mechanics. By lateralizing the analysis, however, Morita moves in 
quite a different direction. Rather than focusing exclusively on practice, he uses the comparative 
labor of the mechanics, and their resulting understanding of the difference between Japanese and 
Thai fields, as his conceptual starting point.  This allows him to challenge conventional 
anthropological notions of Thai culture as well as to offer a new interpretation of the problems 
faced by “technology transfer” initiatives, which are often premised on the idea that the 
recipients of the transfer are local practitioners lacking trans-local knowledge. Furthermore, 
Morita’s comparative adaptation of the machine-generated perspectives of Thai mechanics 
enables him to re-describe ethnography itself as a machine for the articulation of surprising 
comparisons and connections.   
Our own previous research offers another example of the analytical potential of lateral 
conceptualization. While studying the relation between national and EU fisheries regulation and 
practices of fisheries inspection at sea, Christopher grappled with the question of how to 
characterize the culture of sailors and “life at sea.”  Of course, many aspects of such life could be 
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observed “directly” while doing fieldwork onboard an inspection vessel. Surprisingly, however, 
when the crew was asked about their “culture,” they directed him to a 1960s movie, Martha, that 
had received a cult following among sailors in Scandinavia (Gad 2012). As far as they were 
concerned, this movie was far more expressive of their “culture” than their own practices and 
verbalizations.   
 Of course, just as nothing forced Riles to compare Fijian mats to policy documents, 
nothing required Christopher to engage with this unlikely explanatory source. Yet, positioning 
the movie laterally in relation to the field, as offering a “theory of culture,” created certain 
analytic openings. 
Depicting a crew of sailors enjoying life in the Mediterranean on a rusty old ship almost 
forgotten by its owners, Martha dramatized an ideal of the “free” life of seamen. Moreover, it 
showed a struggle between the traditional virtues of seamanship and novel forms of 
technological modernity that threatened those virtues. It also exhibited sailors sufficiently 
independent and strong-minded to “man up” and square the challenges of modern business with 
its emphasis on technological efficiency, control and management.  
Precisely by dramatizing an image of life at sea as it never really was, the movie made it 
possible to grasp the sailors’ felt importance of independence and freedom, which was 
considerably less visible in their everyday inspection practice. Moving laterally from inspection 
practices to the self-image of sailors as evinced by Martha, thus made it possible for Christopher 
to articulate the paradoxical situation in which inspectors found themselves: at once sailors 
congenially unwilling to delimit the independence of other sailors (as one said “it is against my 
nature to control others”) and government bureaucrats working in a heavily regulated and 
technologized environment to do precisely that. 
Moreover, the significance attached by the sailors to the cult movie necessitated a lateral 
extension of the idea of infra-reflexivity. For even as references to the movie occurred in 
particular encounters onboard the ship, the source of reflexivity was not found in “local 
practice.” Analogous to the Thai mechanics, whose practices drew inspiration from the 
“elsewhere” of Japanese fields they had never visited, local practice on board the ship was 
reflexively sustained with reference to the “somewhere else” of a past that never existed. No 
more confined to “local practice” than STS scholars, these cases indicate that our informants 
deploy “inter-reflexive” resources found outside the spatial and temporal confines of their own 
practices. Reflexivity is as much inter- as infra, as it emerges in encounters across contexts or 
networks (see also Ratner 2013). 
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In this brief note we have shown that lateral concepts offer fresh analytical opportunities 
once it is granted that both researchers and those they study are fundamentally decentered. The 
risks and possibilities of the lateral, therefore, are about nurturing an attention to what it takes to 
establish relative forms of compatibility between divergent forms of knowing and acting in such 
a decentered world.  
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